Again, as is my prerogative. I make no apologies for the views that are in italics – they are mine, and mine alone.
Karen
Now some things you hold on to - and some you just let go
Seems like the ones that you can't have
Are the ones that you want most
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This quote is straight from the BBC website Iraq War Enquiry - Live Feed
This is the big one. Tony Blair, the prime minister who took Britain to war in Iraq in 2003, is to face six hours of questioning about his role. The five members of the Iraq inquiry will ask him about the build-up to the invasion, the conduct of the war and the planning and execution of its aftermath. There will be particular interest in the legality - or otherwise - of the war and the discussions between the US and Britain before troops were sent in without a second United Nations resolution. Also expect questions about the claim that Saddam Hussein was developing "weapons of mass destruction”Today will be the start of the ‘interrogation’ of a certain T Blair, over his decision to take the UK into an illegal war. Ok – I don’t have a problem admitting that Saddam was no angel – far from it. What bugs me is the fact that our service men & women have been killed for a pointless (and immoral) war.
0949 Mr Blair says the effectiveness of sanctions before 9/11 was eroding. He adds that he has gone back through his speeches during this period. From 1997 to 2001 Mr Blair says the sanctions in place on Iraq weren't the "top priority". If 9/11 had not happened, the assessment of Saddam would not have been the same. The UK and US view changed "dramatically" at this point, Mr Blair says.
Yeah – Shrub (I mean Bush Jnr) wanted to go one better than daddy, and knock out Saddam.
0952 Sir Roderic Lyne says Saddam was not involved in 9/11 or with al-Qaeda. Mr Blair responds that 9/11 changed perceptions.
What perceptions? Iraq was a threat in 1990 – sanctions pretty much made sure that Saddam & Iraq were a spent force by 9/11.
1005 Mr Blair says he was "never short" of people challenging him during this period, including cabinet ministers Robin Cook and Clare Short. But the Iraq options paper was not specifically discussed at cabinet, he tells the inquiry.
Would have been nice if he’d listened to the voices of dissent, instead of riding roughshod over people. And what happened to full and frank discussions?
1007 The "downside" arguments were about the risks of military involvement and to relationships with the Arab world and others, Mr Blair says. The "full range" of views were received, but "the trouble was, we had to make a decision".
Make a decision? To do what? Act as Shrub’s pet? And I notice that he still took no notice of other peoples views – it was almost as if it was all about what HE wanted.
1013 Sir Roderic Lyne asks whether the removal of regimes had become a "valid objective" of UK policy by 1999. "No," Mr Blair replies. WMDs were the "key issue" in Iraq, he adds.
Yet the UN inspection teams found no evidence after the 1990 war to say that there were any WMDs left – the allies had bombed the areas that were known to house SCUDS and other weapons.
1015 Saddam's regime, which had used chemical weapons on some of its own people, was a "bigger threat" than many others, Mr Blair says.
No-one disputes that he gassed his own people – and he used chemical weapons against Iran during that war as well.
1017 A prime minister must take an assessment of risk, Mr Blair says. Pre-9/11 Saddam had been a "monster" but the UK had to "make best". Afterwards, that changed, he adds. Rogue states cannot be allowed to develop or proliferate WMDs, Mr Blair argues.
Agreed. But Iraq was in no position to get anything truly nasty, as the sanctions pretty much wiped out his ability to trade for anything that could be used.
1029 Mr Blair says he and former Foreign Secretary Jack Straw agreed the UK would try to get a UN resolution. He adds that it was important to put together a coalition on Iraq. The UN route was important as he "didn't want America to feel it had no option but to do it alone".
Yeah – but that didn’t stop Shrub though. He was determined to get his own way, and remove Saddam.
1030 The only commitment at Crawford, in spring 2002, was to deal with Saddam, Mr Blair says. He and Mr Bush agreed on this, but the method of doing so was "open".
See previous comment.
1039 It was clear that, if it came to military action to deal with WMDs, the UK would be "with" the US, Mr Blair says. Force was "always an option", he tells the panel.
As I said – Shrub wanted to go one better and remove Saddam from power.
1041 Back to the Crawford ranch meeting. Sir Roderic Lyne asks whether the US and UK disagreed on the means of tackling WMDs, with the UK preferring the UN route. Mr Blair says that Mr Bush had agreed that "if the UN route worked; it worked".
Like Shrub was really willing to wait for the UN to give the go-ahead for the use of force to tackle the alleged WMDs.
1050 From BBC political correspondent Iain Watson: Again Tony Blair refutes the "poodle" charge which has dogged him. He says that President Bush would have adjusted their policy of regime change if weapons inspections worked and if the UN route had worked. The term 'UN route' is ambiguous though - some believe the UN route meant disarmament without war, others that it simply meant more explicit and widespread backing for military action. Of course ultimately it led to neither.
‘Nuff said.
1113 Mr Blair says military action possibilities were discussed at that Crawford meeting with President Bush in April 2002.
What a surprise. Shrub was never going to wait for the UN to agree to his plans to topple Saddam.
1117 Mr Blair says that, if it was right to conduct a military campaign, it was right for Britain to be involved. It was best, in such a case, to be "right alongside" the US. If war is thought to be right, the UK "should be prepared to play our part fully", Mr Blair adds.
As what? Something to support Shrub in his favourite pastime – and help distract attention from the problems at home. But this should only have been agreed to with the UN sanctioning any action.
1124 Saddam had used WMDs and "definitely had them", Mr Blair says. It would have required much evidence to put the supposed programme to develop more WMDs (weapons of mass destruction) into doubt, he adds.
No-one is disputing that Saddam had used WMDs – but where were they when the UN inspection team was there after the 1990 Gulf war?
1126 Mr Blair says the "link" between Saddam and al-Qaeda - which previous inquiries have suggested did not exist - was that highly suppressed and failing states become "porous" and easier for terror groups to infiltrate. The link between this problem and failing states having WMDs could make them more dangerous, he tells the panel.
Ok – I agree Iraq wasn’t the most stable of countries, but I think that even Saddam would have noticed al-Qaeda coming into Iraq…
1134 On to the September 2002 dossier, claiming Saddam had WMDs he could mobilise within 45 minutes of giving an order. Mr Blair says this was to do with short-range chemical munitions. The words later took on "far greater significance", he adds.
Mobilise in 45 minutes? That’s if the things even existed, which I very much doubt.
1141 Dealing with intelligence evidence, Mr Blair says he believed it when he said in his foreword to the 2002 dossier that it was "beyond doubt" that Saddam had continued to produce biological and chemical weapons.
Beyond doubt? Why weren’t they found then, or more to the point, why didn’t any of the defectors allude to them?
1154 Panel member Sir Roderic Lyne asks whether intelligence in late 2002 was suggesting the WMD threat was growing. It was, Mr Blair says. It was not known at the time that evidence of mobile weapons production facilities - which would have allowed Saddam to evade inspections - was wrong, he adds.
At last. He’s admitted to being wrong about something. Just a pity that he didn’t think more like this when the question of going to war was first mentioned.
1155 From BBC political correspondent Iain Watson: A significant exchange between Sir Lawrence and Tony Blair. The former PM says it is justifiable to say intelligence on Iraq was "beyond doubt" because he prefaces the phrase in the foreword of the September dossier with the word "I believe" and he says he genuinely believed it… that was, in effect his reading of the intelligence and he "couldn't understand how anyone could come to a different view".
Justifiable intelligence? Where? Never mind that he “believed” that the evidence was beyond doubt – other people, including the late Dr Kelly were raising doubts about the validity of the evidence.
1157 From BBC political correspondent Iain Watson: At least a partial admission from Tony Blair that the use of intelligence could have been bettered handled. Tony Blair argues that the now controversial 45 minute claim on Saddam's ability to have WMD ready for use in the September 2002 dossier took on much more significance subsequently than at the time. But Sir Lawrence Freedman is concerned even at the time that the claim was too general and not specific enough. Tony Blair admits with hindsight that it would have been better to have corrected this at the time but again makes clear that there is no truth in the allegation that Downing St used the information knowing it to be probably wrong.
Of course he’s not going to admit he got it wrong – there would be even more pressure to indict him as a war criminal if he said he got it wrong.
1201 On presentation of the UK's Iraq policy in 2002, Mr Blair says there had been no decision on military action but it was a possibility. The "problem" was that people were writing that the UK had decided. If he had said military planning was in place, this could make such a course of action "irreversible", he adds.
It was. It’s just that he didn’t want to admit that he’d committed the UK to an illegal war.
1202 Towards the end of October 2002, the then Defence Secretary, Geoff Hoon, asked Mr Blair to discuss military planning in more detail, he says. Most of this had to be "under the radar" but did not always stay there, he tells the panel.
Under the radar? Only because he didn’t want people realising that he was acting as Shrub’s poodle.
1205 On going to the UN, says the difficulty was that Resolution 1441 was "strong", but there was an "unresolved issue". Some countries wanted to have a decision for action only with a specific UN mandate. Mr Blair took the view that that was not necessary but he thought a new resolution would make the situation easier politically.
Agreed – plus the war would have been seen as legal, and no-one would have objected so much, as there would have been a proper plan to re-build things after the war.
1207 Backing away from Saddam in the run-up to war would have sent a "bad message" for the rest of the world, the former PM says.
Ok – agreed on that, but the war should have been sanctioned by the UN, and there wouldn’t have been so many protests.
1213 Mr Blair is asked whether military planning set the terms of diplomatic debate. There was no doubt Saddam was in breach of UN conditions, he tells the inquiry. There was time enough to get another resolution, but France and Russia moved to another position, Mr Blair says.
Yes – they wanted more time for the inspections to work, rather than rushing headlong into a war.
1224 Saddam was in a "game-playing" situation with the UN's chief weapons inspector, Hans Blix, Mr Blair says. As troops began to build up, the Iraqi leader started to give more cooperation. Mr Blix was not "enthusiastic" about interviewing Iraqi scientists, as they, or their families, could be killed.
No-one is disputing the fact that Saddam used terror to keep people in line – it was one of the most disgusting things about his regime.
1225 From BBC political correspondent Iain Watson: Tony Blair makes an important distinction between Saddam and Col Gaddafi, who dismantled Libya's WMD programme under international scrutiny. The former PM is implicitly arguing that it doesn't really matter if Saddam had WMD - the fact that, unlike Libya, he did not co-operate, concealed documents, and restricted access to scientists means that he was in breach of his obligations to the UN and could not be trusted not to resurrect a weapons programme even if one wasn't in the end active at that time - that the UN was into a "game playing scenario" with Saddam.
Add into that, Gaddafi paid “blood money” to the Lockerbie victims, and has quite a large oil reserve… Hmmm I wonder if oil had anything to do with the determination to get rid of Saddam… Surely not.
1227 Mr Blair says he was "confused" as to what Mr Blix was trying to say in February 2003. On one page of his briefing, he says Iraq has made a commitment to allow interviews but there was a reluctance to follow through. Sometimes it is important not to ask the "March 2003 question" but the "2010 question", Mr Blair says. It is at least arguable that Saddam was a threat and if he had been left in place for several more years, with oil at $100 a barrel, he would have had the intent and the means to act, and the UK and its allies would have "lost our nerve", he argues.
Ahhh – now the truth comes out. Oil. Never mind the WMDs – oil is FAR more important.
1229 Mr Blair says he worked for a UN resolution "until the last moment".
Liar.
1234 Mr Blair says he tried to find a way, with Mr Blix, to move on, constructing tests for Saddam's regime, including interviewing Iraqi scientists outside the country.
Like Saddam would have agreed to that, and Blair knows that – he’s just looking to protect his own skin.
1235 The UK was "trying desperately" to get a way of going ahead with the UN, Mr Blair says. However, it became "very clear" that France and Russia's position on agreeing to any resolution had changed.
France and Russia wanted to exhaust all options, before going to war, unlike Shrub and his pet.
1240 From BBC political correspondent Iain Watson: Although no weapons of mass destruction were found following the war but Tony Blair says the findings of the Iraq Survey Group that Saddam had the means and "know how" to restart a weapons programme justifies action.
Maybe he did have the means and the know how to restart things, but I doubt somehow that Saddam would have been that stupid, given his past history with the US.
1241 Asked whether he urged President Bush to give more time to reach a UN resolution, Mr Blair says that Saddam had not cooperated before. Mr Blair says that, if a resolution could be put together, Mr Bush was in favour, but there was not the time.
No, because they didn’t want to make time. If they had been serious about the UN resolution, they would have found a way to get things sorted out.
Back at 14:00, when this resumes.
Karen
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