Blair on trial. I wish. (Part 2 )

This continues from the previous post, where Tony Blair is giving evidence to the Iraq War enquiry.

Karen

Now some things you hold on to - and some you just let go
Seems like the ones that you can't have
Are the ones that you want most

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1409 Mr Blair says he tried one "last-ditch chance" to get a UN solution, by defining more clearly the definition of a breach of the UN's will in terms of WMDs.

Right. But only because he would be able to plead that in his defence.

1412 As the war approached President Bush told Mr Blair that, if going into Iraq was too difficult, he would understand if the UK did not get involved, the inquiry hears. It was a "tough situation", Mr Blair adds.

So tough that he still went ahead and supported his little buddy.

1413 Mr Blair says he "genuinely hoped" the UN path would work.

If that was the case, why didn’t he try harder to get the agreement?

1416 From BBC political correspondent Iain Watson: Tony Blair confirms that George Bush was willing to go it alone in Iraq if it was "too difficult" for Britain but the former PM says his judgement - a word he's used often - was that the alliance with America was important and he had been down a UN path that he had hoped would work and had done everything he could to avoid this "tough choice" - and that the military agreed "if we were going to be part of this we should be whole hearted".

Yeah, but he didn’t, and the war went ahead regardless of what anyone said.

1416 The aftermath of the invasion was "the most difficult part", Mr Blair says, adding that to have kept out of this would have been wrong.

No, wrong was going into Iraq in the first place without the UN mandate.

1420 Sir Roderic Lyne moves on to the issue of the legality of the war, which has been such a focus of previous hearings this week. He is summarising what was said previously, allowing Mr Blair to interject if he disagrees at any point.

1425 Mr Blair says he is happy with the summary of legal issues so far. So Sir Roderic continues with his narrative of the way the debate over legality of the war went in the run-up to war.

1423 Sir Roderic Lyne says there was "consistent and united advice" from Foreign Office lawyers that fresh UN authorisation would have been needed to make the use of force against Iraq lawful. However, resolution 1441, which was passed by the UN, was not "crystal clear". Up until February 2003 the then Attorney General, Lord Goldsmith, said that a further decision by the Security Council was required, he adds.

1428 Sir Roderic Lyne says that Lord Goldsmith said later that Resolution 1441 was compatible "in principle" with authorising force, but, if the matter came before a court, he was not confident this would work. He had, "to a degree", parted opinion with the Foreign Office lawyers, he adds. Lord Goldsmith was asked for a "yes or no" decision. By 13 March, he had decided that "on balance" there was a lawful basis for use of force without having to go beyond Resolution 1441. But this required a determination that Iraq was "in further material breach" of its obligations. Lord Goldsmith said he had asked Mr Blair to say this and Mr Blair had done so. This gave the "green light" for action, Sir Roderic says

1434 Mr Blair says Sir Roderic's was a "fair summary of the legal background". He adds that Resolution 1441 declared Saddam was in breach of the UN's demands.

In other words, he can’t argue with the facts. Makes a nice change…

1436 Mr Blair says he was given a Foreign Office paper on 8 March 2002 setting out legal terms for action against Iraq. Military action had been taken against Saddam in 1993 and 1998, he adds. The legal advice made it important to go down the UN route, Mr Blair tells the inquiry. The government was a "long way" from a decision, so the attorney general was not brought in at that point.

Doesn’t alter the fact that he didn’t ask for advice on the legality of the war…

1436 Sir Roderic Lyne says it seems the attorney general rarely discussed the issue of Iraq with Mr Blair, particularly in 2002. Mr Blair says Lord Goldsmith had been "closely involved" but did not attend cabinet until the decision was to be taken. That was the usual practice, he said. However, he added that Lord Goldsmith was giving his advice to the prime minister and ministers, Mr Blair says.

Even if advice was given, it was ignored, or more to the point, bent to make it fit with the desired purpose.

1438 Once discussions about action in Iraq began with the Americans, Mr Blair says he was sure by March 2002 that it was important to go via the UN route.

If that was the case, why wasn’t everything done to gain this resolution?

1441 Resolution 1441 was adopted by the UN in November 2002. By early 2003 the armed forces had been instructed to prepare for action, Sir Roderic Lyne says. He asks whether it would have been useful to have the attorney general's advice. Mr Blair says if Lord Goldsmith had said action against Iraq was unlawful, it would not have happened. Mr Blair says the government knew its options. It had not received formal advice, but Lord Goldsmith had made clear his opinion.

And that opinion was ignored, along with the advice, as it didn’t give the answer that was wanted.

1444 Mr Blair says he was "well aware" that Lord Goldsmith was saying that a second UN resolution was needed. Saddam made a "material breach" of the existing Resolution 1441, he added. There was "at least as powerful an argument" in favour of just one, rather than two, resolutions, he adds.

But that didn’t stop the planning for the invasion, even though it would have been illegal under international law.

1447 From BBC political correspondent Iain Watson: Tony Blair confirms military preparations were under way even before the 'first' UN resolution -1441- was passed but makes it clear ultimately no action would have taken without legal cover for it

Typical of Blair – he just wanted to go along with what Shrub wanted.

1449 The "spirit" of Resolution 1441 was that Saddam would get one final chance, Mr Blair says. Otherwise "that's it", he adds. A further resolution would have been politically preferable, Mr Blair says.

Never mind politically preferable – it would have been better for everyone if this second resolution had been obtained. That way, a cohesive plan for the aftermath would have been in place.

1450 From BBC political correspondent Iain Watson: Tony Blair sidesteps the question of what he said if anything to the Attorney General between 7th and 13th March 2003 when the Attorney General's advice "'evolved"' - in other words when Lord Goldsmith ditched caveats and gave the green light for military action.

Bit close to the truth? Maybe he realised just what he was getting into at long last – but I doubt it.

1452 Sir Roderic Lyne suggests it was a "considerable relief" when Lord Goldsmith offered different advice, on 13 March 2003. Mr Blair says he did so because of the Hans Blix evidence suggesting Saddam had not complied with Resolution 1441. But Sir Roderic says this was contrary to many international lawyers' opinions. Mr Blair says all countries which took military action believed they had a legal reason for doing so.

Crap. It just meant that the Attorney General caved in to political pressure, and started toeing the line that Blair and Shrub wanted him to.

1456 Sir Roderic Lyne asks Mr Blair how convinced he was that the UK had a strong legal case after Lord Goldsmith's advice. Mr Blair says Lord Goldsmith would not have reached his opinion "unless he believed it". The attorney general had not said he would not have won a court case with such a point, merely that it was arguable either way, Mr Blair says. On this advice, the former PM says he decided "to go forward".

No – it means that Lord Goldsmith lost his backbone, and gave the answers that Blair and co wanted to hear – not what was needed.

1500 From BBC political correspondent Iain Watson: Asked if he felt there was a strong legal case for war, Tony Blair said the Attorney General had to come to a decision which in the end, he did. Throughout this session Tony Blair been keen to stress Lord Goldsmith’s "top rank" experience as a lawyer, his integrity and his desire to give advice whether required or not - in other words, he has sought distance himself from suggestions that he or his officials could have leant on the attorney general to water down legal objections to war. But the question of what Tony Blair said to Lord Goldsmith in the crucial week of 7-13 March wasn't hotly pursued.

Rubbish. Lord Goldsmith was leaned on by his “political masters” and just bleated out whatever they wanted to hear – in this case, that there was no requirement for the UN resolution.

1504 The defence spending review of 1997 stated that the military should be given sufficient time for planning actions, panel member Baroness Prashar says. Mr Blair says that on Iraq, for a time, the government was worried about making planning too visible and "triggering an assumption" of invasion. He repeats that, in October 2002, Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon said: "We really need to get on with this." Army chief General Sir Mike Jackson had been clear that the forces would be ready, Mr Blair says.

The military would have been ready, regardless of what Geoff Hoon said – that’s their job.

1508 There was visible preparation later, but in mid-2002 there was a concern that people did not start to think an invasion was inevitable, Mr Blair says. And "it really wasn't", he adds

Funny – he’s pretty much admitted to being committed to the invasion, so how can he say that the invasion wasn’t inevitable?

1510 After a very brief set of questions on military preparation, Mr Blair is asked about planning for the war's aftermath. There was an "immense amount" of this, he tells the panel. The "real problem" was that some wrong eventualities were prepared for. The focus was on humanitarian outcomes, which averted a disaster. But the oil fields were not burned and chemical and biological weapons not used.

The Iraqis burnt the Kuwaiti oil fields during their retreat in 1990, but Saddam wasn’t daft enough to damage something that he could use to get money into the country… Humanitarian concerns? What about the ordinary people who suffered after the invasion, as the insurgency took hold, and they were being killed along with our service personnel?

1511 One of the planning assumptions, Mr Blair says, was that there would be a functioning Iraqi civil service below the top level. But dealing with a "semi-fascist state" like Iraq makes that assumption wrong, he adds. It was necessary to rebuild the civil infrastructure from nothing, as it was a "completely broken system".

True – if you weren’t a member of the Baath party, then you weren’t allowed to be part of the government. But the trouble was, not everyone was a committed party member…

1513 The risks and resources required were weighed up and the UK "could not walk away from the people of Iraq" after the war, Mr Blair says. Bu the UK would have done some things differently in hindsight, he adds.

Hindsight is a wonderful thing, but until someone invents a time machine, you’re screwed.

1516 From BBC political correspondent Iain Watson: There's been a lot of debate about whether troops were properly equipped for action and whether enough planning had been done - and whether Gordon Brown as chancellor was properly resourcing the troops. Tony Blair attempts to take the political sting out of this early on by saying that it was up to the military to judge if they were prepared and that he as PM "never refused a request for money and equipment".

That may be the case, but what about the required investment in decent kit, and making sure that there was enough for everyone?

1522 Mr Blair again says the UK did not plan for the absence of a functioning Iraqi civil service. He adds that "people did not think al-Qaeda and Iran would play the role that they did". The latter influences nearly caused the mission to fail, Mr Blair says. These are the same forces confronted as in Afghanistan, he adds.

What a surprise – there was no plan for the absence of a functioning civil service, That was apparent from the outset – all these plans for fighting, but nothing to help with the aftermath.

1524 From BBC political correspondent Iain Watson: Tony Blair is very reluctant to admit to mistakes in planning for the aftermath. The key mistake for him was to assume there would still be a functioning Iraqi civil service after the invasion but said that another potential problem - sectarian violence - was tackled swiftly when Shia, Sunnis and Kurds were quickly brought together. The subsequent problems are blamed on the influence of Iran – a pretty constant bête noire for Tony Blair today - and al-Qaeda.

What a surprise – Blair doesn’t like admitting he was wrong. Guess that comes with the territory of being a politician...

1527 Mr Blair says states like Iraq under Saddam are repressive and secretive. The question for other countries is whether it is necessary and possible to engage in such places, he adds. Inquiry chairman Sir John Chilcott calls another break, with questioning expected to recommence at about 1550 GMT.

Ok – Iraq wasn’t the most open place, but I still don’t see the reason why we needed to invade Iraq.

1546 Mr Blair says the plan was that the aftermath would not require as many troops as the conflict itself. The issue in southern Iraq was not the number of troops, but how reconstruction could get going while, fairly early on, there were groups opposed to this.

Whoops – someone didn’t do their homework… The Shia sect of Islam is predominant in Iraq – and it was only Saddam's iron fist that kept a lid on things…

1549 Saddam was toppled very quickly but the allies found the situation was different to that which had been expected, Mr Blair says. Another assumption, that Iran would not be provocative, also started to change, with its backing for the Mehdi Army of Moqtada al Sadr, he adds.

Like Iran wouldn’t miss the chance to stir things up. Technically, the Iran-Iraq war was only ever on a cease-fire – no peace treaty / agreement was ever signed.

1553 On funding for aid and redevelopment, Mr Blair says extra money was agreed with the Treasury in March 2003. Iraq was the "key country" for the Department for International Development in 2003-04, he adds. The problem, which became clearer, "was not a lack of resources, but a lack of security".

Which anyone with an ounce of common sense could have seen happening, as Iraq is such a mix of cultures. It was only Saddam’s ruthless control that kept a lid on things.

1556 There was "much discussion" of the Shia-Sunni issue, Mr Blair says. But people did not believe al-Qaeda and Iran would have a destabilising influence. The Iraqi people were not in favour of violence or sectarianism, he says.

No, because it wasn’t in their interest. But a tiny (but well armed) minority had other ideas, and decided to stir things up, to cause trouble for the US and the UK.

1558 The UK tried to "reach out" to Iran, but one of the "most disappointing" aspects of the mission was that the country became a major destabilising influence in Iraq, Mr Blair adds.

Iran wouldn’t spit on either Shrub or Blair if they were on fire – they’d be more likely to pour crude oil on them to help the fire, so appealing to them wasn’t really a smart move…

1600 The government asked for an assessment on Iran's likely attitude for an invasion of Iraq, Mr Blair says. The evidence was it would have a "watching brief" and "be pleased" to get rid of Saddam.

Wouldn’t you be pleased to get rid of someone who did so much damage to your military in an eight year war?

1602 Returning to his "twenty ten" point, Tony Blair says that if Saddam had been left in power he has "little doubt" that Iraq would now be "competing" with Iran on nuclear weapons and in support of terrorist groups.

Open to debate again – Saddam would have only supported the terrorist groups if it had suited his agenda.

1604 From BBC political correspondent Iain Watson: Tony Blair launches another verbal attack on Iran - this time, for deliberately trying to destabilise post-war Iraq but Sir Roderic Lyne, the most dogged of Mr Blair's inquisitors, wonders why this wasn't anticipated. Tony Blair says the advice - presumably the intelligence - suggested that Iran would be glad to see the back of Saddam and would be "amenable" to the new Iraq

Anyone could have foreseen this happening – Iran for years has wanted to challenge the Sunni rule in the Middle East, and Saddam was an impediment to this happening. It’s highly unlikely that Iran wouldn’t have taken the opportunity to make sure that it was a Shia led government that came into power in post-Saddam Iraq.

1609 On the disbanding of the Iraqi army by the US, Mr Blair says he is "not sure" about the policy. It would have been "sensible" for the Americans to have a discussion about it.

It looks like the US have a lot to answer for in some respects – as their forward planning seems non-existent.

1612 Panel member Sir Lawrence Freedman says WMDs were not found and this was the "headline for most people". He asks when Mr Blair thought this was likely to be the case. During 2004 it became "difficult to sustain" the possibility WMDs might turn up, he answers.

There was never any chance of turning up the WMDs, as there was no political will, from either the US or the UK to assist with the inspections, and put pressure on Saddam to facilitate the inspections.

1614 The force required to remove a regime is "one function", but there will have to be nation-building afterwards, Mr Blair says. This may require more or different types of forces, he adds.

Regime change. That was the ultimate end, but no-one seemed to give any thought to the reconstruction side of things…

1616 Mr Blair says the "very purpose" of the people the UK ended up fighting in Iraq was to stop reconstruction. In such circumstances "you don't move to peace-keeping" straightaway, because "your enemy is trying to kill you".

True – but it was because the people who were part of the insurgency thought that the US and UK had invaded their country. Technically, we had done so.

1622 From BBC political correspondent Iain Watson: Tony Blair says the problem wasn't the pace of reconstruction in post-war Iraq but security - although he also implicitly admits that more attention would have to be paid to "nation building" if a similar situation were to exist in future.

Hindsight again.

1625 It was bound to take a "certain amount of time" to win the battle of creating stability in Iraq, Mr Blair says.

Yeah – talking to the people first might have helped – they might not have felt so angry about the invasion once the euphoria of getting rid of Saddam and his murderous regime faded.

1631 On the deaths of Iraqi civilians since the war, Mr Blair says the coalition forces were not the ones doing the killing. It was terrorists and sectarians, "deliberately" trying to end the stabilisation process. These were "precisely the same people we were trying to fight everywhere". People in southern Iraq are now better off than under Saddam and have hope of a better future, Mr Blair says. Panel member Sir Lawrence Freedman says that claim is up for debate.

Agreed – the coalition personnel were not doing the killing – but if they hadn’t been there, then the bombs wouldn’t have been going off near their bases.

1632 From BBC political correspondent Iain Watson: The inquiry takes a more emotive turn with Sir Lawrence pointing to the growing civilian death toll after the invasion. Tony Blair passionately argues that this is the fault of the terrorists. But the inquiry are interested in whether coalition troops could do more to protect people and opponents of the war would blame the invasion for unleashing the violence.

Whatever the pros and cons of this argument, there is only so much that the military can do to protect the civilian population, as they were limited by both numvers and equipment. It’s a case of chicken and egg – without the troops, there would have been little violence and Saddam still in power, but with them, Saddam was removed but the violence kicked off.

1635 Mr Blair says there was not a "cavalier" attitude to planning for the aftermath of the war. But, however much you plan and whatever forces you have, al-Qaeda and Iran would have made the task difficult. This was no reason to "back away", Mr Blair says. Nobody would want to go back to the days of no hope, opportunity or freedom, he adds.

That’s a bit of a joke, the whole aftermath planning smacks of a cavalier attitude – as in “things will sort themselves out”

1641 Mr Blair says the "key players" in the UK government were in close contact as planning for the war developed.

In close contact? What with? A brick wall?

1643 The cabinet had 25 pre-invasion discussions, Mr Blair says. There was a "constant interaction", he adds. Members of the cabinet did not feel they were not involved, even Robin Cook, who eventually resigned over the war, Mr Blair says.

Robin Cook was the only member of the government who had the courage of his convictions, and resigned as a matter of principal, as he opposed the invasion.

1651 The cabinet was focused on political issues at the time of making decisions on whether to go to war, Mr Blair says. Even Robin Cook, who quit over the war, said it was necessary to get a second UN resolution for such reasons, he adds

So why didn’t he listen? Or was he too taken with the idea of regime change, as proposed by his buddy, Shrub?

1653 From BBC political correspondent Iain Watson: Tony Blair is keen to rebut the allegation that he led entirely from the front on invading Iraq and that though his colleagues may have been behind him, they were a long way behind. He says there were 25 discussions on Iraq at cabinet meetings - and that most of the cabinet agreed with him, but could challenge if they wish (and as the late Robin Cook did) - and there was an "immense amount" going on in Clare Short's International Development Department; implicitly he's saying she shares responsibility for decisions though she resigned after the conflict. It had been suggested that Tony Blair had kept some senior colleagues out of the loop on key decisions. He suggests Clare Short was involved in post war planning discussions well before the war itself began.

Talk about trying to wriggle out of the blame. By blaming Clare Short, it takes the heat off of him, and makes him look slightly less culpable.

1655 There could have been a major legal debate about military action in Kosovo in the late 1990s but there was not, because it was not such a politically divisive issue as Iraq, Mr Blair says.


Kosovo, unlike Iraq, had UN sanctioning, so there is no comparison between the two.

1656 From BBC political correspondent Iain Watson: Tony Blair ends the questioning on post-war planning with his customary defiant and robust tone - he seems more assured here than on the dense questioning on the legality of the conflict earlier. He says there was no "cavalier" attitude taken to planning the aftermath of war and that - as with Afghanistan - you have to be prepared for the long haul

Strange – that doesn’t seem apparent at the moment – the lack of planning is criminal.

1703 Inquiry chairman Sir John Chico says the "liberators" of Iraq soon came to be resented. He asks whether the people of Iraq thought the invasion and subsequent efforts worthwhile. Mr Blair says it is "too early" to say whether Iraqi democracy will function effectively and take root, although there are "hopeful signs". Income per head has risen, money is being spent on infrastructure, he adds. It was a "very, very difficult fight" and that the UK will be better prepared and educated if it takes part in future nation-building exercises

We shouldn’t have been in this position in the first place! The coalition was resented the minute the euphoria of Saddam’s overthrow wore off, and the bombs started exploding in the market places, killing not only the troops, but civilians as well.

1705 Mr Blair says child mortality has fallen in Iraq because of the change of regime - 50,000 fewer young children dying each year he says. The majority of Iraqis would overwhelmingly say the situation is preferable to that under Saddam, he adds.

True – there is no more state sanctioned murder to remove rivals to power. But equally, the overwhelming majority of Iraqis want the coalition out of their country.

1708 Mr Blair is asked about the anger felt towards him over the Iraq war, and whether he has regrets. He replies that he had to take the decision for war and there is "not a single day" when he does not think about it. He adds that, had he left Saddam in power, the circumstances for dealing with him would be worse. Mr Blair says he is "sorry" the war was divisive, but the UK's security is better without Saddam and his sons in power. He feels responsibility but not regret for removing Saddam Hussein. As the session comes to an end he says he believes "the world is safer as a result" of the Iraq war.

The UK’s security has improved without Saddam? What planet is he on? It’s worse since he helped Shrub remove Saddam, and things won’t improve until we get out of Iraq.

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All this enquiry has done so far, is proven that Blair is a liar, who was more intent of posing and trying to impress his little friend Shrub. At the end of this, I can’t see any answers worth their paper being produced. If I’m wrong, then I will cheerfully post a retraction of this particular comment on my blog, but I doubt I’ll have to do that.

Guess I should log off and head for home – it is a Friday night after all…

Back when I get the chance.

Karen